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The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article
Compared With West Virginia Law*
WILLARD D. LORENSEN**
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in West Vir-
ginia would provide for the first time in the history of this state
a general legislative venture into the field of sales law. Court-made
common law is the present source of sales law, and typical of the
common law, a very uneven pattern is found. Precedents pile up
at certain points while numerous other questions float in an absolute
void of authority. The major portion of this study, composed of a
section by section analysis of the sales article, contrasts time and
again the thoroughness and detail of the Code against the generality
and inconclusiveness of the present law.
The major impact of the adoption of the Code sales article
then is quite simple to state: Its adoption would increase immeasur-
ably the certainty and precision of the law of sales in this state.
And the Code poses this certainty and precision in fairly usable
form. Its organization is intelligent and easy to follow. Section
titles are adequate to draw the reader's attention to pertinent pro-
visions. Cross references are liberally employed and should protect
anyone, willing to make a reasonable effort at understanding the
Code, from the embarrassing oversight of pertinent related provisions.
Some generalizations about the sales article may prove helpful
in providing an introduction. Here are some of the more important
changes that the Code would make:
First, it abandons the title concept in favor of what may be
called a "transaction concept" for resolving many sales problems-
e.g., allocating risk of loss, bringing an action for price, etc. In
other words, Code provisions deal directly with most of these
problems rather than indirectly through a determination of who
has "title."
* This is the first of a series of studies of the Uniform Commercial
Code and existing West Virginia law. See, Introduction to the Uniform
Commercial Code, supra at 28. All references are to the official edition of
1958. It will be cited throughout in the footnotes as U.C.C.
** Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
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Second, a statute of frauds relating to the sale of goods involv-
ing more than 500 dollars is included. The Code is a uniform law
and follows the vast majority of states in providing for a limitation
on the enforceability of oral agreements. This provision is care-
fully drawn and though contrary to the existing policy of West Vir-
ginia it is doubtful that any significant upheaval would occur in this
era of duplicate forms and tax-accounting record-keeping require-
ments.
Third, warranty law would be materially clarified and the pro-
tection afforded to buyers from merchant sellers would be expanded.
The "sealed container" exception would be abolished, but a seller
of a sealed container would receive in turn similar warranty rights
against his supplier.
Fourth, some contract rules would be relaxed in so far as they
pertain to the sale of goods. For example, the parole evidence rule is
narrowed and the rule requiring an acceptance to be identical to an
offer is overhauled.
Fifth, the application of some rules would vary depending upon
the parties involved. This means that businessmen (called "mer-
chants" in the Code) are held to more businesslike standards than
non-businessmen in certain instances. For example, a businessman
who has received a confirmatory memorandum of an oral agree-
ment and has failed to object to its terms promptly may find that
the memorandum, though unsigned, will be enforced against him as
an exception to the statute of frauds provision. And a merchant
may make a binding offer without supporting consideration where
certain formalities are met, though a non-merchant could not so
bind himself.
Other changes would flow from the adoption of the Code.
Many of these are difficult to describe concisely because the present
state of the law is frequently difficult to state with both brevity
and preciseness. Assaying the quality and character of these changes
depends upon a determination of the present state of the law and
at many of the finite points of the Code sales article, the correspond-
ing West Virginia law may be the subject of much honest debate.
What follows is an attempt to assess briefly after each Code
provision just how that provision would affect existing law. The
Code provisions are set in bold face and the editorial remarks on
each is set in regular type. References to comments in the footnotes
19611
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are to the official comments accompanying the Code provisions and
not to the remarks of this writer.
Section 2-101. Short Title.
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform
Commercial Code-Sales.
West Virginia never adopted the Uniform Sales Act which is
displaced by the sales article of the Code. The Uniform Sales
Act was to a large extent a codification of common law and paral-
leled in many respects the English Sale of Goods Act. The Sales
Act was a codification of common law, it was on occasion referred
to by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.' Needless to
say, the necessity to resort to case law makes present research into
sales law in West Virginia a painstaking and time consuming task.
Section 2-102. Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions
Excluded From This Article.
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to
transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which
although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present
sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does
this Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to con-
sumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
West Virginia has recognized that a transaction which appears
to be a sale absolute on its face may in fact be a security transaction,
reaching this result by analogy to real property law and the deed
absolute intended as a mortgage.' No provisions in the present West
Virginia Code have been found which would fall within the "specified
classes of buyers" proviso at the conclusion of the present Code
E.g. Hill & Gain v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 W. Va. 554, 4 S.E.
2d 793 (1939). (In a case in which the court decided that no true warranty
was given, the court stated that the prior rule in West Virginia that the giving
of an express warranty negatives all implied warranties, save the warranty
of title, was abandoned. In so doing, the court apparently considered the
position of -the Uniform Sales Act as persuasive as to what the common
law ought to be.)2 Frederick v. Stump, 136 W. Va. 350, 67 S.E.2d 613 (1941).
[ Vol. 64
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section. Particular distinctions have been made from general law
analogous to this situation, but not in the area of the sales of goods.'
Section 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions.
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy
goods.
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade.
(c) "Receipt" of goods means taking physical possession
of them.
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods.
(2) Other definitions applying to this article or to specified
Parts thereof, and the sections in which they appear are [omitted]:
There is no specific change in West Virginia law that can be
attributed to this particular provision. The primary definitions of
the section, along with many others incorporated by reference
through subsections (2), (3) and (4) not set out above, are included
as a part of the Code's general concern for precision in the use of
language. Buyer is defined in subsection (1) in a manner somewhat
narrower than in section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act. There
buyer included "any legal successor in interest of" the original buyer.
A literal reading of this provision could have led to the conclusion
that a sub-purchaser was technically a buyer and thus in privity
with a prior seller-an interpretation which was not widely indulged
in needless to say. The Code definition of buyer is more limited,
and problems of privity are dealt with directly according to the
transaction and not by definitional accident. Good faith as pertains
to merchants here clearly includes a combination of standards,
honesty in fact plus observance of reasonable commercial standards.
3 E.g. W. VA. CODE, art. 33, ch. 6, § 4 (Michie 1955). This provision
allows a minor to make a binding contract for the purchase of certain forms
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The definition of receipt is included to make clear where the term
is used in the sales article that receipt is not always the result of
delivery. There can be delivery and yet no "receipt" of the goods.
The various incidents of a delivery are dealt with throughout the
Code.
Section 2-104. Definitions: "Merchant"; "Between Merchants";
'Financing Agency".
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices of goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill
(2) "9Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or
other person who in the ordinary course of business makes advances
against goods or documents of title or who by arrangement with
either the seller or the buyer intervenes in ordinary course to make
or collect payment due or claimed under the contract for sale, as
by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances
against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not docu-
ments of title accompany the draft. "Financing agency" includes also
a bank or other person who similarly intervenes between persons
who are in the position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods
(Section 2-707).
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with re-
spect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or
skill of merchants.
One of the unique features of the Code sales article finds its
genesis in this provision. At various points, the Code develops rules
which apply different standards to merchant as opposed to non-
merchant buyers and sellers. These varying standards may be found
in provisions relating to the formation 'of contracts,4 relative to cer-
4 See, U.C.C. § 2-201 (2) (statute of frauds exception, applicable to
merchants only, where merchant receives a memorandum and fails to object
to the terms stated therein within a stated period); § 2-205 (firm offer
provision, signed writing without consideration creates an irrevocable offer
under certain circumstances, but is applicable only to merchants); § 2-207
(special provisions relating to inclusion of additional terms to contract where
included in acceptance where the transaction is between merchants); §2-209
(special rules established as to limitations on modifications of contracts).
[ Vol. 64
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tain duties connected with the performance of sales contracts5 and
in regard to implied warranties.6 There is no such clearly defined
distinction presently made under West Virginia law, though there
are occasions where the fact that one of the parties to the trans-
action was a merchant has doubtless had a significant bearing upon
the court's determination of what standards are to be applied. For
example, an early West Virginia case stated the following rule,
clearly couched in terms of a special rule applying to merchants:
"Where one merchant sends goods to another and at the same
time sends invoices of such goods, and the goods and invoices
are received by the merchant, to whom they are sent, whether
he ordered the goods or not, in law he will be regarded as
purchaser, unless within a reasonable time he returns the goods
or notifies the sender, that he will not accept them."'
This rule has been applied in numerous subsequent cases, always
involving transactions between merchants.' The general proposition
that one is considered a buyer where he fails to return the goods
or notify the sender of his non-acceptance has been stated in gen-
eral terms in some of these later cases, apparently not limiting its
applicability to merchant buyers.' While there is no case on point,
it seems doubtful that a duty of return or notification would be
imposed upon a non-merchant who received goods not ordered
from the sender.
Section. 2-105. Definitions: "Transferability"; "Goods"; "Future"
Goods; "Lot"; "Commercial Unit."
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
5 See, U.C.C. § 2-603 (special obligations placed upon merchant buyer
who has rightfully rejected goods); § 2-605 (provision permits merchant
seller to demand written specification of defects upon which rejection is
based where buyer also is a merchant).6 See, U.C.C. § 2-314 (implied warranty of, merchantability applies only
where seller is a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind"...7 Bartholomew v. Paull, 18 W. Va. 771 (1881) Syl. 1.
8 Dixie Appliance Co. v. Bourne, 138 W. Va. 810, 77 S.E.2d 879 (1953);
Great Eastern Refining Corp. v. Shank, 99 W. Va. 101, 127 S.E. 922 (1925);
Linger v. Wilson, 73 W. Va. 669, 80 S.E. 1108 (1914); Ford v. Friedman,
40 W. Va. 177, 20 S.E. 930 (1895); Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va. 377,
13 S.E. 1015 (1891).
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investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also
includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on
goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any in-
terest in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and
identified are "future" goods. A purported present sale of future
goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified
goods.
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods
is sufficiently identified to be sold although the quantity of the bulk
is not determined. Any agreed proportion of such a bulk or any
quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight or other measure
may to the extent of the seller's interest in the bulk be sold to the
buyer who then becomes an owner in common.
(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the sub-
ject matter of a separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is suffi-
cient to perform the contract.
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by com-
mercial usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of
which materially impairs its character or value on the market or
in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or
a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or
a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated
in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.
The definition of "goods" is important as it describes the kinds
of transactions to which the provisions of the Code apply. The
Code changes a number of basic contract rules and consequently
the rule which will apply in a given case, if the Code is adopted,
will be determined by whether a sale of goods is involved or some
other kinds of contractual obligation undertaken. The Code def-
inition hinges principally upon moveability.'" Specially manufac-
'oFickeisen v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 67 W. Va. 335, 67 S.E. 788 (1910)
characterized the transmission of electric power into a buyer's lines as a sale
with delivery at the connecting points between the lines of the seller and
the buyer, and with title and consequently risk of injury passing at that point.
The Code does not specifically deal with the question of whether the sale
of a public service commodity such as water or natural gas involves a sale
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tured goods, machines specially designed for a particular plant,"
draperies made to order for a given home or office, would involve
the sale of goods under the Code provision. Investment securities
and things in action are specifically excluded from the sales article
of the Code as they are covered separately under article 8. Also
excluded is "money in which the price is to be paid." Conversely,
a sale of money as a commodity and when it is not used as a medium
of exchange--e.g. a sale of a valuable coin collection-would be a
sale and subject to the provisions of the Code. 2
Specifically included within the term "goods" are the unborn
young of animals and growing crops. In this respect the Code
adopts in unambiguous fashion the old common law concept of
"potential possession" which permitted a present sale of things which
were potentially within the possession of the seller. 3 The common
law concept of potential possession, recognized in West Virginia,'
4
was limited on grounds of public policy-a man should not be
permitted to sell so much of his future that he entered a kind of
peonage2 This same limitation is brought about by the Code by
its requirement of "existence" and "identification" to pass an in-
terest in goods, as opposed to creating a contract to sell goods in
the future. Identification of goods is controlled by section 2-501
and places definite limits on the ability to make a present sale of
goods not yet in actual possession of the seller.'6
It should be noted that the Code abandons the use of the term
"industrial" crops, recognizing that "fruit, perennial hay, nursery
I1 Wheeling Mold & Foundry Co. v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 62
W. Va. 288, 57 S.E. 826 (1907) (sale of specially manufactured machines.)
12 "Money" generally was excluded from the definition of goods under
the UNnFoRM SLES AcT § 76. Several New York cases have held that
ordinary rules of sales law apply where currency is sold as a commodity.
See, Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930);
Zimmerman v. R. & H. Chemical Co., 240 N.Y. 501, 148 N.E. 659 (1925).
1 WiLLisroN, SALES § 66b (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as WIisToN,
SALES].
3 See WILLISTON, SALES § 133; VOLD, SALps § 45 (2d ed. 1959).
' 4 Wiant v. Hayes, 38 W. Va. 681, 18 S.E. 807 (1893). The court stated
in syllabus 2, "Personal property, to be the subject of sale, must have an
existence, but a potential existence is sufficient."
'S VOLD, SALES § 45 (2d ed. 1959).
16 U.C.C. § 2-501 provides that identification may be made at any time
and in any manner explicitly agreed upon by the parties and establishes
general rules as to identification where there is no such explicit identification.
Crops, under these general rules, are identified when planted or they become
"growing crops" (the latter provision covers perennial crops) and the un-
born young of animals are identified when conceived.
1961]
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stock and the like" 7 should be brought within the concept of
present goods.
Section 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Contract
for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Conforming"
to Contract; "Termination"; "Cancellation."
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires "con-
tract" and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the present
or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a present
sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale"
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price (Section 2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is ac-
complished by the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accord-
ance with the obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract
otherwise than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations
which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right
based on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to
the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the same as
that of "termination" except that the cancelling party also retains
any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed
balance.
No significant change in existing law can be attributed di-
rectly to this provision which serves mainly to fill out the general
aim of the Code to provide a self-sufficient statement of the law
of sales. Subsection (1) hints at -the sales article's disconcern with
title by noting that "contract for sale" includes both a present sale-
now called an "executed sale"-and a contract to sell goods at a
future time-now called an "executory sale." Whether a sale is
executed or executory can have substantial significance under present
law because a good bit of sales law is based on title, and once title
17See U.C.C. § 2-105, Comment 1.
[ Vol. 64
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passes, a sale is "executed." Legal rights and relationship in regard
to the goods are dealt with directly by Code provisions and not by
reference to the distinction between executed or executory sales in
most cases.
Section 2-107. Goods to be Severed From Realty: Recording.
(1) A contract for the sale of timber, minerals or the like or
a structure or its materials to be removed from realty is a contract
for the sale of goods within this Article if they are to be severed by
the seller but until severance a purported present sale thereof which
is not effective as a transfer of an interest in land is effective only
as a contract to sell.
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing
crops or other things attached to realty and capable of severance
without material harm thereto but not described in subsection (1)
is a contract for the sale of goods within this Article whether the
subject matter is to be severed by the buyer or by the seller even
though it forms part of the realty at the time of contracting, and
the parties can by identification effect a present sale before sever-
ance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third
party rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and the
contract for sale may be executed and recorded as a document
transferring an interest in land and shall then constitute notice to
third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract for sale.
Section 2-107 treats generally of the twilight zone between
realty and personalty. Subsection (1) deals with sales of standing
timber, minerals, structures and the like and subsection (2) pro-
vides different rules for growing crops and "fixtures." Subsection
(3) deals with problems of recording.
Subsection (1) provides that sales of standing timber, minerals
and the like are sales of goods where the seller is to sever such com-
modities from the land. But there is no sale, or actual passage of
property interest, in such goods until they are severed. Thus deals
for standing timber and such items remain as transactions involving
interests in realty where the buyer is to sever. This accords with
present West Virginia law.
1961]
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Since Fluharty v. Mills, 8 West Virginia has characterized sales
of standing timber as sales of interest in realty in those cases in which
the buyer is to sever. Sales of timber where the seller is to sever
have been dealt with as sales of goods without any overt concern
that such a deal too might involve an interest in realty. 9 Likewise,
the sale of coal and other minerals in place to another who will re-
move have been treated as sales of interest in realty," ° while sales
of goods when produced or severed by the seller have been treated
as sales of goods.2"
On the other hand growing crops and "fixtures" are treated as
goods irrespective of whether the buyer or seller is to sever, by the
terms of subsection (2). The term "fixture" is not employed in the
section and is "avoided because of the diverse definitions of this
term," according to the official comments. 2 What is normally
thought of as a fixture is included within the phrase "other things
attached to realty and capable of severance without material harm
thereto."
Subsection (3) generally provides that contracts for sale of
such items as are covered by the provision may be recorded "as a
document transferring an interest in land." What effect the filing of
a contract relating to the sale of crops would have in West Virginia
is an open question presently. In connection with this provision, it
should be noted that security interests, such as mortgages of grow-
ing crops, are covered by article 9 where the definition of "goods"
is somewhat different from that of the sales article.
Section 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
1849 W. Va. 446, 38 S.E. 521 (1901). Accord, Bourn v. Dobbins, 92
W. Va. 263, 115 S.E. 424 (1922); Gibson v. Stalnaker, 87 W. Va. 710, 106
S.E. 243 (1921); Brown v. Gray, 68 W. Va. 555, 70 S.E. 267 (1911).
1 9 E.g. Ohio Valley Bending Co. v. Pickens, 74 W. Va. 303, 81 S.E.
1041 (1914).20 DONLEY, COAL, Om & GAS IN WEsT VIRoINIA AND VIRGINIA, § 27
(1951).
2 1 E.g. Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91
W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922) (sale of entire output of mine, seller
to sever).22 See U.C.C. § 2-107, Comment 3.
[ Vol. 64
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or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity
of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing
in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is
received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents,
it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party
unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten
days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller,
before notice of repudiation is received and under cir-
cumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial be-
ginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought ad-
mits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is
not enforceable under this provision beyond the quan-
tity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been
made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted (Sec. 2-606).
West Virginia has never had a statute of frauds relating to
sales, thus this provision adds something entirely new to the law
of this state." The only statute of frauds provision which has played
any role in the West Virginia law of sales in the past has been the
provision relating to contracts not to be performed within one year'
4
-and this provision has been narrowly construed."
23 About ten other states have no statute of frauds relating to contracts
for the sale of goods.
24W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 1, § I(f) (Michie 1955).
"1 See, e.g. Wood & Brooks Co. v. D. E. Hewitt Lumber Co., 89 W. Va.
254, 109 S.E. 242 (1921). (The court held that a contract which could be
performed within one year was not within the statute though plaintiff buyer
acquiesced in delays that extended period of performance well beyond one
year before breach occurred.)
1961 ]
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As pointed out by the official comments" all that the writing
need contain to meet the Code requirements are (1) evidence of a
sale of goods; (2) the "signature"27 of the party against whom en-
forcement is sought; and (3) a quantity.
Three other points should be noted about the Code provision.
First, a confirmatory memoranda of an oral deal between merchants
will substitute for a signed memorandum where this memorandum
has come to the attention of the person against whom enforcement
is sought and that person fails to object to its contents. Failure to
object to such a memorandum by an ordinary consumer would not
bind such a person.2" The West Virginia Supreme Court has noted
on occasion in deals between merchants that failure to object to
such writings on the part of the merchant may be convincing proof
of his assent to the terms stated in such writing.2 9
Second, the "part performance" exception to enforcement of
an oral contract otherwise within the statute of frauds is limited.
The part performance doctrine under present application of the
statute of frauds permits, for example, the delivery and acceptance
of a small quantity of goods to open the door to proof of an oral
contract for a much larger quantity.3" Under the Code provisions,
subsection (3) (c), enforcement of the oral contract would be per-
mitted only to the extent of the performance made and the contract
would remain unenforceable as to parts not performed.
26See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 1.
27 "Signed" is defined in the general article of the Code, U.C.C. § 1-201
(39) which states "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing."2 'This is one of several points at which the Code makes a distinction
between deals between merchants and deals in which one of the parties
involved is not a merchant.
29 See Tide Water Oil Sales Corp. v. Jarvis Oil Co. 114 W. Va. 493,
172 S.E. 522 (1933) and Braude & McDonnell v. Isadore Cohen Co. 87
W. Va. 763, 106 S.E. 52 (1921). In the Tide Water case, involving a dispute
over a modification of a contract, the trial court held the failure of the
merchant buyer to object to a merchant seller's letter confirming a telephone
conversation regarding contract modification barred him from claiming a
different agreement was made in the telephone conversation than was re-
flected in the letter. This ruling was reversed, however, because payments
made by the buyer shortly after the telephone conversation showed the
buyer manifested promptly his different understanding of the orally modified
agreement. The Supreme Court ruled, thus, that a jury question was raised.
The Braude & McDonnell case relied heavily on the failure-to-object
principle to justify its holding that a bill of sale absolute on its face could
not be shown to be a sale or return agreement by parole. This is of course
more directly a parole evidence question, discussed in more detail in remarks
on U.C.C. §§ 2-202 and 2-326, infra.
1o E.g. Ocleese v. Davis, 124 Cal. App. 2d 58, 268 P.2d 175 (1954).
[ Vol. 64
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Third, subsection (3) (b) permits enforcement of an oral con-
tract where such contract is admitted in "pleading, -testimony or
otherwise in court" by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
Thus a party cannot admit the existence of the contract and deny
its enforcement because it is not in writing. It should be noted in
connection with this provision that under the West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure, the statute of frauds must be pleaded affirmatively
as a defense. The person who honestly contests the existence of the
oral contract would not be placed in the dilemma of having to tacitly
admit the contract by affirmatively pleading its unenforceability.
Rule 8(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure permits
alternative pleadings and thus a party may deny in the alternative
the existence of the contract and its enforceability under the statute
of frauds provision."
Section 2-202. Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evi-
dence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing in-
tended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with
respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
This provision would relax in general the application of the
parole evidence rule to contracts involving the sale of goods. This
change may be considered in two aspects, following the mechanical
division of the Code provision. First, the Code provision expressly
authorizes the use of custom of the trade, and the like, under sub-
section (1) (a), to explain terms reduced to writing. Second, the
Code narrows the limitations of the parole evidence rule upon show-
ing additional consistent terms which were a part of the bargain
but were not reduced to writing.
The provisions of subsection (1) (b) makes a definite change
in the broad statement of the rule admitting evidence of course of
a1 See Martin v. Wilson, 371 Pa. 529, 92 A.2d 193 (1952).
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dealing and the like to explain and supplement a written contract.
There are several flat statements by the West Virginia Supreme
Court that such evidence is admissible only where the contract is
ambiguous." This approach is definitely rejected in the Code
which pointedly omits any determination of "ambiguity" as a con-
dition to the admission of such evidence. The actual results of
some West Virginia cases seem to be very much in harmony with
the tenets of the Code, general statements to the contrary notwith-
standing. For example in Raleigh Lumber Co. v. William A. Wilson
& Son,33 the court held, over objections based on the parole evidence
rule, that evidence of usage of trade was admissible in a sale of lum-
ber to a lumber wholesaler. The contract called for a given quantity
of lumber, listed maximum and minimum sizes, but gave no limits
as to the amount of lumber of any one size. The buyer refused the
first shipment under the contract because it was almost wholly short
lengths and narrow widths and was successful in its rejection because
in sales of lumber at wholesale, usage of the trade demanded the
greater portion of the lumber to be in long lengths and wide widths.
And again in Hall Mining Co. v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 4 the West
Virginia Supreme Court pointedly referred to usage of trade in
order to determine that a clause was ambiguous and thus subject to
the principle of "practical construction." Rejecting the appellee's
argument that the contract was clear and unequivocal, the court
said:
"While the clause relied upon said the agent should pay not
less than $1.10 net per net ton for each and every ton of coal
shipped, it must be read in connection with all the others, and
also in the light of the facts disclosed, showing the situation
of the parties, their purpose, the nature of the business to
which the contract relates and the usual method of conducting
it.,,35
Note that the court here employed usage of trade and course of
performance to show that there was an ambiguity in order to justify
the use of these same sources of understanding to clarify that am-
32 Elder v. Tucker, 116 W. Va. 94, 178 S.E. 629 (1935); Salisbury v.
Brooks, 81 W. Va. 233, 94 S.E. 117 (1917). See, remarks on Code section
2-208.
1169 W. Va. 598, 72 S.E. 651 (1911).
14 69 W. Va. 47, 70 S.E. 857 (1911).
35 Id. at 50, 70 S.E. at 658.
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biguity. 6 Such disposition of cases can hardly be reconciled with
the broad statements of the ambiguity rule.
A more explicit change in West Virginia law results from a
combination of the language of the main portion of the section and
that of subsection (1) (1). The official comment to the section
begins with a statement that the provision "definitely rejects . . .
any assumption that because a writing has been worked out which
is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all matters
agreed upon; . . ."' It should be noted that the provision states only
that terms included in the written memorandum may not be con-
tradicted by parole evidence. Expressly authorized is the admission
of evidence of "consistent additional terms" unless the court finds
that the writing was intended as "complete and exclusive." It seems
clear that the results of several past West Virginia decisions would
have been different had this provision been applicable at the time
they were rendered. The problem has recurred most frequently in
cases where the buyer sought to establish an oral warranty on the
part of the seller where some written memorandum had been made
which was silent on the question of warranties. The policy is well
established in West Virginia that evidence of such oral warranty is
not admissible where the written memorandum contains other sub-
stantial terms of the sale. 8 For example, in Griffen v. Runnion,9
"6 See, Hardman Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 86 W. Va. 404, 103
S.E. 282 (1920). In this case, judgment was reversed because the trial court
limited the defendant's cross-examination of the plaintiff as to his knowledge
and understanding of usage of the trade and as to past understandings of
similar written agreements of sale between the parties. The dispute involved
whether the "per foot" price of crating material referred to board feet or
surface measurement.
17 Note the following from O'Farrell v. Virginia Public Service Co.,
115 W. Va. 502, 505, 177 S.E. 304, 305 (1934): "If a contract seems
complete on its face, 'the presumption is that it contains the whole of the
agreement, and this presumption generally is conclusive.' Braude & McDonnell,
Inc. v. Isadore Cohen Co., 87 W. Va. 763, 106 S.E. 52. This Court went even
further in Jones v. Kessler, 98 W. Va. 1, 126 S.E. 344, saying that the presump-
tion was conclusive.. . ." See also the rather extended discussion of the parole
evidence rule in Hartman v. Windsor Hotel Co., 136 W. Va. 681, 68 S.E.2d
746 (1951) and the unhappy basis for the resolution of the perplexing problem
of whether the contract there involved was "ambiguous."3
1Appalachian Power Co. v. Tate, 90 W. Va. 428, 111 S.E. 150 (1922)
(sale of a refrigerator); Griffen v. Runnion, 74 W. Va. 641, 82 S.E. 686
(1914) (sale of a stallion); Erie City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co., 68
W. Va. 519, 70 S.E. 125 (1911) (sale of a machine); Watkins v. Angotti,
65 W. Va. 193, 63 S.E. 969 (1909) (sale of machinery). Compare, Guyan-
dotte Coal Co. v. Virginian Elec. & Mach. Works, 94 W. Va. 300, 118 S.E.
512 (1923). (Court seemingly infers that sellers oral refusal to warrant
could be shown to negate the existence of even implied warranties where
subsequent written memorandum was silent on the question of warranties.)
19 74 W. Va. 641, 82 S.E. 686 (1914).
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a group of buyers purchased a stallion which was, according to the
seller's own admission, orally warranted as a virile animal. But
the court refused to give credence to the oral warranty because a
memorandum had been drawn identifying the seller, the buyers, the
subject matter of the sale, and relating the price and terms of pay-
ment. Several other cases have arisen involving similar fact situa-
tions and reaching similar results. ' While the policy of admitting
or excluding parole evidence of additional terms cannot be stated
with exactitude because it must apply to limitless varieties of writ-
ings, it seems clear that the Code provision would make a substantial
change in direction. Present West Virginia policy starts with the
proposition that if the written memorandum includes sufficient terms
to indicate a sale, additional terms may not be shown. The Code
provision approaches this problem from the opposite direction and
admits additional terms unless the memorandum not only evidences
a sale, but also is in fact the "final and exclusive" statement of terms.
Can the person furnishing the contract form gain the advan-
tage of the present broad application of the parole evidence rule
by including a clause in the contract which states that it contains
all the terms and agreements? To this, there is no pat answer. In
areas which appear to have been most troublesome, the Code pro-
vides rather direct solutions. In other areas, a good bit of discretion
is placed directly in the hands of the courts.
First as to the recurring sources of difficulty. The disclaimer
of warranties or their exclusion by omission from the contract
coupled with a parole evidence clause in the contract is limited by
Code section 2-316. Briefly, the provision makes it difficult to
"surprise" a buyer with an unbargained limitation upon warranties.
The second trouble spot is the oral agreement to the "or return"
feature in a contract of sale or return in which only the sale aspect
has been evidenced in a writing. West Virginia has adopted the rule
that a writing evidencing a sale absolute on its face cannot be shown
by parole to have been a sale or return agreement." The Code
reaches the same result by a combination of the present section,
2-202, and a later provision dealing with sale or return, section
2-326, which provides that the "or return" portion of the agreement
contradicts a written agreement of sale and would thus not be ad-
missible under the parole evidence section.
40 See note 36, supra.
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In remaining areas, it should be noted that the Code expressly
gives courts authority to refuse enforcement to "unconscionable"
provisions. See the remarks in relation to this provision, section
2-302.
Section 2-203. Seals Inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for
sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing
a sealed instrument and the law with respect to sealed instruments
does not apply to such a contract or offer.
West Virginia retains to some degree the common law rules
regarding seals as they affect sales transaction,42 and thus the
complete abolition of the law of sealed instruments as regards the
sale of goods would work a change in the law of this state. The
period of limitations, the defenses which could be raised and the
question of consideration are the points at which the effect of the
seal is most often considered. As to the period of limitations, West
Virginia has made no distinction between contracts in writing under
seal and not under seal.43 The period for both has been the same,
ten years. As to defenses which might be raised to an action on a
sealed contract, a West Virginia statutory provision has permitted,
by a limited set-off provision, certain defenses to law actions which
under older common law were cognizable only at equity.44 Nonethe-
less, one West Virginia case said that "want of consideration" would
not be allowed as a defense in an action at law upon a sealed instru-
ment.45 It appears then, that in West Virginia it is still possible to
make a binding or irrevocable offer without consideration being
given if it is given in writing under seal.
42 See, Bullig & Wunschell, The Present Status of the Private Seal in
West Virginia, 40 W. VA. L. Q. 330 (1934); Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138
(4th Cir. 1936) rev'd on other grounds, 300 U.S. 31 (1937).43 W. VA. CODE, ch. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1955).44 W. VA. CODE, ch. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie 1955). Fisher v. Burdett,
21 W. Va. 626 (1883) held that the statute, while applying to "contracts"
generally, included parole contracts and contracts under seal.45 Williamson v. Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 205 S.E. 917 (1895). The court
held that the set-off provision, see note 44, supra, admitted the defense of
"failure of consideration" in a law action upon a sealed instrument, but did
not affect the common law rule that "want of consideration" could not be
raised as a defense at law to an action on a sealed contract. Eclipse Oil Co.
v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S.E. 923 (1899) ruled that want
of consideration would be a defense to an action seeking equitable relief
upon a sealed instrument.
1961 ]
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The adoption of the Code in West Virginia would make it clear
that defenses to contract actions involving the sale of goods would
not be affected by the contract being under seal, and the power to
make a binding or "firm" offer would not hinge upon the use of
the seal. It should be noted that the Code does provide that a
merchant may make a "firm" offer-one that is irrevocable for a
period of time even though no consideration is given-under sec-
tion 2-205.
Section 2-204. Formation in General.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
, (2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended
to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy.
Generally, this section would not materially alter the law of
West Virginia. Some language can be found which indicates a dif-
ferent approach, e.g. "If anything remains to be done to make a
contract, if all the terms have not been mutually agreed upon, no
contract arises between the parties . . ."" But, in other instances
the court has pointed to the ease with which contractual obligations
may be made. 7
The provision was inserted basically to insure a liberal ap-
proach to finding the existence of a contract where the sale of goods
46Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co., 63 W. Va. 51, 53, 59 S.E. 753,
754 (1907). Plaintiff attempted to establish, by his own equivocal testimony,
an oral contract for the sale of standing timber, and the court ruled, con-
cluding in the language quoted in the text, that no such contract was estab-
lished. The court further ruled that plaintiff's action in assumpsit was
improper since his title to the land from which the timber was cut was
in question.
Ohio Valley Bending Co. v. Pickens, 74 W. Va. 303, 81 S.E. 1041 (1914)
could be construed as contrary to the provision. There buyer sued to recover
cash advanced on certain timber to be cut and delivered by the seller. The
seller defended claiming he had been damaged in a greater sum by the
buyer's failure to accept the timber cut. The court held that the jury could
have found that no contract was ever consummated though it appears that"conduct by both parties" recognized the existence of the contract.47 E.g. Bartholomae & Co. v. Paull, 18 W. Va. 771 (1881).
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is concerned because, it was felt, commercial practice recognizes
very informal dealings under many circumstances. Other provisions
of the Code, e.g. section 2-305 dealing with an open price term,
elaborate upon the general principle of this provision.
Section 2-205. Firm Offers.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no
time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period
of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assur-
ance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by
the offeror.
This provision would reverse the existing West Virginia law.
While it may be possible today to create a "firm" or "binding" offer
by use of a sealed writing," any other offer may be revoked at any
time prior to acceptance.49 Note that the Code section provides that
only merchants may bind themselves by a written, signed offer and
it also guards against inadvertent creation of firm offers by requiring
separate signing of such a provision where it is included in a form
furnished by the offeree.
Section 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language
or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as in-
viting acceptance in any manner and by any medium
reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) An order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or
current shipment shall be construed as inviting accept-
48 See, Section 2-203 and remarks.
49 Allen v. Simmons, 97 W. Va. 318, 125 S.E. 86 (1924). (Syllabus 2.
". Prior to [unconditional] acceptance the buyer is at liberty to with-
diaw his offer." This was an offer in writing by a merchant.) Morgan-
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ance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the
prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-
conforming goods, but such a shipment of non-con-
forming goods does not constitute an acceptance if the
seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment
is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a rea-
sonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of ac-
ceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having
lapsed before acceptance.
In the main there could be no change in West Virginia law
resulting from this provision.
Subsection (1) (a) changes slightly the approach to the ques-
tion of whether a particular means of communicating an acceptance
was authorized under the circumstances. The official comments to
the section note that "former technical rules as to acceptance, such
as requiring that telegraphic offers be accepted by telegraphed ac-
ceptances, etc., are rejected.""0 West Virginia apparently has never
adopted any unnecessarily technical approach to this problem. Oral
acceptances of written offers have been held adequate.' The
standard rule is usually couched in terms of what means of accept-
ance were authorized by the nature of the communication of the
offer and the surrounding circumstances.52 The Code provision
puts no peculiar emphasis upon the means of communicating the
offer but this remains, of course, as one of the significant elements
bearing upon the reasonableness of the means used to communicate
the acceptance.
Subsection (1) (b) resolves one little trick problem not evi-
denced in any West Virginia case and affirms a general principle
which has been previously recognized in this state. The general
principle is that an order for goods authorizes acceptance by the
10 u.c.C. § 2-206, Comment 1.
51 Creigh v. Boggs, 19 W. Va. 240 (1882); Capehart v. Hale, 6 W. Va.
547 (1873).
52 1 WILLISTON, CONTRC'rS § 83 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957). Three States
Coal Co. v. Superior Elkhorn By-Products Coal Co., 110 W. Va. 455, 158
S.E. 661 (1931) is cited in support of this proposition by Williston.
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shipment of the goods. 3 The trick comes when the seller ships
non-conforming goods in response to the offer of purchase. If
these goods are accepted by the buyer, he has technically accepted
a counter-offer. If he rejects the goods, as he of course has the
right to do, he may find himself without any recourse against the
seller, as the seller can claim no contract was ever consummated
because his acceptance did not conform to the buyer's offer.54 The
Code would shift the tactical advantage here somewhat. Unless the
seller shipping non-conforming goods notifies the buyer that they
are being shipped "for accommodation only" he is held to have
accepted the buyers offer by his shipment. Thus, if the goods are
accepted by the buyer, they are accepted on his original terms,
rather than upon the counter-offer terms of the seller, and the buyer
has an advantage in negotiating an adjustment for the non-con-
formity of the goods. If the seller notifies of the "accommodation"
shipment, the buyer is given earlier notice that he may expect sub-
stituted performance or must search elsewhere for the desired goods.
Subsection (2) places a duty on an offeree who may accept
by performance of promptly notifying the offeror of his acceptance.
The start of performance under such circumstances usually bars
the offeror from revoking his offer, but the mere beginning of per-
formance does not constitute an acceptance binding the offeree to
complete his performance. 5 Thus the offeree is given an unfair
advantage in such circumstances in that he may bind the offeror
without binding himself and "play the market" in the meantime.
The requirement that notice be given to the offeror substantially
shortens the period where the offeree has such a lop-sided advantage.
Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or dif-
53 Magruder v. Hagen-Ratcliff & Co., 131 W. Va. 679, 50 S.E.2d 488
(1948) (sales contest, acceptance by performance); Wood & Brooks Co. v.
D. E, Hewitt Lumber Co., 89 W. Va. 254, 109 S.E. 242 (1921) (lumber seller
held bound to supply 500,000 board feet of lumber though apparently seller
never promised to ship this amount but did ship some lumber in response to
buyer' offer to take that amount); Ladies Tailoring Co. v. Brown, 76 W. Va.
725, 86 S.E. 767 (1915) (merchant buyer's counter-offer held accepted by
shipment of goods in response to such).
5 4 The buyer may be further burdened here because the Code places
upon him certain duties as regards rightfully rejected goods. See, Section
2-603 and remarks.
5 5
RESTATEMENT, CoNntAcrs § 45 (1932).
19611
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol64/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ferent from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
additions to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless:
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although
the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.
In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this Aci.
West Virginia has adopted the traditional view that an accept-
ance is ineffective if it alters or adds to the terms of the offer."
The proposed Code section would change this view to meet the
rather frustrating battle of forms which recurs in modem business
practice. The battle of forms occurs for example when a buyer
offers to purchase certain goods on an order form of his own, and
acceptance is returned upon a form prepared by the seller. Though
the buyer and seller may then proceed with performance where the
essential terms of price, delivery, quantity, etc., are agreed upon,
there may in fact never hfive been a contract consummated under
56 Allen v. Simmons, 97 W. Va. 318, 125 S.E. 86 (1924); Morgan-
Gardner Elec. Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 347, 112 S.E. 587
(1922); Compare, Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Lake & Export Coal
Co., 93 W. Va. 155, 116 S.E. 145 (1923). (Seller's offer to buyer was
accepted and when seller confirmed receipt of buyer's acceptance, seller re-
quested buyer to obtain transportation permits to move sold coal from mines;
Held: defendant buyer could not defend on basis that seller's demand that
buyer obtain transportation permits added new conditions to the contract
as sale was F.O.B. mines and it was impliedly buyer's task to arrange
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present law, because of conflict or variances between the offer and
the acceptance.
Subsection (1) provides that in most situations an acceptance
or confirmation will create a binding contract even though addi-
tional terms are included in the acceptance or confirmation. Sub-
section (2) then proceeds to set up rules to determine which addi-
tional terms become a part of the contract and which do not.
The West Virginia case of Allen v. Simmons57 illustrates how
the law would be changed at this point by the adoption of the Code.
In the Allen case, a West Virginia merchant signed an order for
feed solicited by a salesman of an out-state seller. The order
was subject to confirmation by the salesman's principal. When con-
firmed, the seller added to the written order or offer by stating that
the seller's performance would be excused by strikes, car shortages
or other causes beyond seller's control and that Board of Trade
weights would be final as to the determination of the amount shipped
under the contract. After this confirmation, the merchant revoked
his order because he had decided to go out of business. The mer-
chant was successful in his defense against the seller's action for his
refusal to accept the goods because, the court held, he had revoked
before there had been an unequivocal acceptance of his offer. There
was nothing to show that the merchant objected to or was prejudiced
by the terms added by the seller at the time of its confirmation of
the merchant's offer to buy. Under the Code provision, a binding
contract would have been created by the seller's acceptance. Whe-
ther the added terms would have become a part of the contract
would be determined by subsection (2). Thus, the added terms
would have become a part of the contract unless (1) the merchant's
offer expressly was limited to unconditional acceptance of his offer;
(2) the added terms materially altered the offer; or (3) the mer-
chant objected to such added terms within a reasonable time after
notice of them was received. 8
The addition of the terms involved in the Allen case would not
"materially alter" the offer under the Code. 9 The official comments
57 97 W. Va. 318, 125 S.E. 86 (1924).
58 There was some dispute in the Allen case as to whether the confirma-
tion by the seller had ever been communicated to the buyer. The court held
that this was immaterial in that the terms added by the seller made the
acceptance ineffective and thus permitted the buyer to revoke his offer even
if the confirmation or acceptance had been communicated to the buyer.
"The court in the Allen case hinted it might have reached the same
conclusion upon proper evidence, viz., it was stated that the added terms
could not be held "immaterial" absent evidence showing trade custom that
such were usual terms of sale.
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to the Code note that section 2-615 excuses performance because of
a failure of presupposed conditions and that some enlargement of
such excuses by means of added terms of acceptance does not "ma-
terially alter" the terms of the offer.6" Material alterations are those
which would cause "surprise or hardship" if incorporated, according
to the comments.'
Section 2-208. Course of Performance or Practical Construction.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions
for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of
the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other,
any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without ob-
jection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course
of performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade
shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each
other, but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms
shall control course of performance and course of performance
shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade (Section
1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modifica-
tion and waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to
show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such
course of performance.
Basically, this section would make no change in West Virginia
law, though broad language running contrary to the policy of the
provision is readily available in decisions of the West Virginia
Supreme Court. For example in Salisbury v. Brooks, the court said:
"Resort to [course of performance as a] .. .mode of ascertain-
ing what a writing was intended to accomplish or express is
allowed only where its meaning is doubtful or its terms am-
biguous, and not otherwise. The writing speaks its own mean-
ing when there is no ambiguity or uncertainty." 2
60 See, Virginia, Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Co., note
56, supra.
61 See, Morgan-Gardner Elec. Co. v. Beelick Knob Coal Co., note 56,
supra (change of date of delivery from "as soon as possible" to a date about
six months hence, oral understanding with seller's agent that "as soon as
possible" meant within two or three weeks).
62 81 W. Va. 233, 237, 94 S.E. 117, 119 (1917).
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The code provision, contrawise, encourages the use of practical con-
struction and does not hinge resort to consideration of the course
of performance upon a prior determination that the contract lan-
guage is ambiguous. Cases which contain statements such as that
found in Salisbury v. Brooks usually involve an attempt to enlarge
occasional or sporadic acts into a "course of performance.""3 For
example, in the Salisbury case, the seller attempted to show that a
contract of absolute sale rather than an agency to sell had been
created upon the basis of two transactions which appeared to be
outright sales to the agent but where other more numerous transac-
tions under the same agreement had clearly involved the agency
formula.
In such cases, the acts relied upon by the party seeking to invoke
practical construction do not fall within the definition set out in the
Code section. Thus, what was called a course of performance and
ignored by the court on grounds of an unambiguous contract would
not amount to a course of performance under the Code provision.
The apparent disparity may be resolved then on a shift in emphasis.
Clearly, Hall Mining Co. v. Consolidated Fuel Co.," is in ac-
cord with the Code provision. That case involved a contract term
requiring a selling agent to pay a fixed amount per ton of coal
sold, and based upon monthly settlements repeated over a period of
eight months the court concluded that the contract actually meant
the agent was bound to obtain at least the stated amount on an
average for all coal mined.
The provision would elaborate the law in this area but would
not make any practical changes."
63 See, Babcock Coal & Coke Co. v. Brakens Creek Coal Land Co., 128
W. Va. 676, 37 S.E.2d 519 (1946); Elder v. Tucker, 116 W. Va. 94, 178
S.E. 629 (1935).
64 69 W. Va. 47, 70 S.E. 857 (1911).
65 See, Franklin v. Pence, 128 W. Va. 353, 36 S.E.2d 505 (1945). (Act
of accepting sight drafts for first two shipments of lumber held relevant to
determine method of payment where contract silent on this particular.) Elk
Refining Co. v. Falling Rock Cannel Coal Co., 92 W. Va. 479, 489, 115
S.E. 431, 435 (1922). ("Happily, however, in the present instance, we are
guided by a high authority. That is to say, tho construction put upon the
instrument by the parties themselves." This, following a determination that
the contract language was ambiguous.) Compare; implicit reliance on practical
construction involving only a single performance where buyer purchased a
stack of lumber containing woods other than beech but written contract
called for only beech. Hartland Collier Co. v. J. N. Barnes & Brother Co.,
112 W. Va. 44, 163 S.E. 714 (1932).
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Section 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this article
needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescis-
sion except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or
rescinded, but except as between merchants, such a requirement
on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by
the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this
Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified
is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as
a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory
portion of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notifi-
cation received by the other party that strict performance wil be
required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust
in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
Subsection (1) makes a clear change in the present West Vir-
ginia law. The provision states that a modification to a contract
needs no consideration to be binding. West Virginia has adhered
to the rule that doing what one has already promised and bound
himself to do is not a consideration which will bind a modified
promise.6" The drafters of the Code felt that commercial practice
recognizes modification without consideration as fair."7 The thrust
of the rule in West Virginia has been blunted by the apparent ease
66 Bischoff v. Francesa, 133 W. Va. 474, 56 S.E.2d 865 (1949); O'Farrell
v. Virginia Public Service Co., 115 W. Va. 502, 177 S.E. 304 (1934); Vance
v. Ellison, 76 W. Va. 592, 85 S.E. 776 (1915); Thomas v. Mott, 74 W. Va.
493, 82 S.E. 325 (1914); 22 W. VA. L. Q. (Ta BAR, April) 41 (1915).6 7 See, HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (1958) at 11: "Most modi-
fications of sales contracts run afoul of the pre-existing duty rule, but there
have been growing doubts as to the soundness and social wisdom of that
rule, and this has influenced some courts in their actual decisions to evade
it. Evasions take the form of rationalizations couched in terms of mutual
rescission, waiver and gift."
See also, I ConIN, CONTRACTS § 184 (3d ed. Jaeger 1950); Patterson,
An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 929 (1958).
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with which mutual modifications of prior contracts may be made,6"
coupled with the announced rule that the court will not look behind
a "dispute" under an original contract to determine who in fact
was "right" or gave up something in order to constitute considera-
tion for the new, modified agreement.69
Subsections (2) and (3) limit oral modifications of contracts.
Subsection (2) permits the parties to prescribe their own statute of
frauds, so to speak, by requiring modifications of the contract to
be in writing.7" In deals not between merchants, such provisions
limiting future modification require separate signing. Subsection
(3) makes it clear that if the contract as modified would be within
the statute of frauds provision, the modification must be in writing.
Subsection (4) makes it clear that though an agreed change
in the original contract may not satisfy the requirements of the two
preceding subsections relating to when the modification must be in
writing, the attempt to modify may operate as a waiver. This pro-
vision seems to be aimed at the same situation resolved to the same
effect in Simpson v. Mann.' There, Simpson sought to recover for
work performed in constructing a building above and beyond the
contract price on the basis of additional work orally agreed upon
by Mann. The original contract provided that "no alterations or
additions shall be allowed or paid for" unless agreed upon in writing.
The court ruled flatly that such provision in the original contract
could not bar future oral modifications. The result is compatible
with the Code provision on the basis of the defendant's waiver of
the written modification provision by acceptance of the work ac-
cording to the oral modifications. It is problematical of course what
the court would have held had the defendant Mann notified the
builder that he would not accept construction according to the terms
of the orally modified contract and Simpson would have refused to
proceed according to the original contract. If there had been no
6 8 See, Tide Water Oil Sales Corp. v. Jarvis Oil Co., 114 W. Va. 493,
172 S.E. 522 (1933) (question of whether parties agreed to a modification
was for the jury, though original contract was definite on the question of
price which was the principal subject of the modification). See, 4 Micnm's
JuRis., Contracts § 54.69 Producers' Coal Co. v. Mifflin Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 311, 95 S.E. 948
(1918).
70 See enforcement of such provision in Wood v. J. Q. Dickinson &
Co., 115 W. Va. 723, 117 S.E. 770 (1934) holding seller's cooperation with
a test of delivered machine which varied from testing method specified in the
contract did not bar the seller from refusing to accept objections based
upon such tests as showing machine failed to meet performances guaranteed.
71 Simpson v. Mann, 71 W. Va. 516, 76 S.E. 895 (1912).
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material change in position by Simpson, there seems to be no reason
why the original contract provision restricting prohibiting oral modi-
fication could not and should not be enforced. Subsections (4)
and (5) anticipate these problems and offer equitable solutions.
Section 2-210. Delegation of Performance; Assignment of Rights.
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless
otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest
in having his original promisor perform or control the acts required
by the contract. No delegation of performance relieves the party
delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer
can be assigned except where the assignment would materially
change the duty of the other party, or increase materially the bur-
den or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right to damages
for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the as-
signor's due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned
despite agreement otherwise.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary a prohibi-
tion of assignment of "the contract" is to be construed as barring
only the delegation to the assignee of the assignor's performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights
under the contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an
assignment of rights and unless the language or the circumstances
(as in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary, it is a
delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and its ac-
ceptance by the assignee constitutes a promise by him to perform
those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or
the other party to the original contract.
(5) The other party may treat any assignment which delegates
performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may
without prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand assur-
ances from the assignee (Section 2-609).
This provision is a general restatement and elaboration of the
law relating to assignment of rights and the delegation of duties
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under sales contracts. It follows general principles of contract law
already recognized in this state."2 Subsection (5) is noteworthy in
that it expressly provides that the non-assigning party to a contract
may demand adequate assurance of performance under section
2-609 of the Code. This right has been indirectly recognized by
the West Virginia Supreme Court.73
[A further discussion of the Sales Article will
appear in the next issue.]
7 See, e.g. Atlas Powder Co. v. Nelson, 124 W. Va. 298, 20 S.E.2d
890 (1942); Twentieth Street Bank v. Summers, 90 W. Va. 90, 110 S.E.
478 (1922).
71 Myers v. Cook, 87 W. Va. 265, 104 S.E. 593 (1920). The court
intimated that the non-assigning party to a logging contract would have the
right to demand assurance of adequate performance from the assignee of the
other original party who had assigned the right to do the logging.
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